Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy
Nick Bostrom (New York: Routledge, 2002)
On its fourth print run. Reviews below.
Amazon.com ($90,00)
Alternatively, you could request that your library buys it if it hasn't got it
Nick Bostrom (New York: Routledge, 2002)
On its fourth print run. Reviews below.
Amazon.com ($90,00)
Alternatively, you could request that your library buys it if it hasn't got it
A selection effect is introduced by the fact that the instrument you use to collect data (a fishing net, a mail survey, preserved trading records) samples only from a proper subset of the target domain. Analogously, there are selection effects that arise not from the limitations of some measuring device but from the fact that all observations require the existence of an appropriately positioned observer. Our data is filtered not only by limitations in our instrumentation but also by the precondition that somebody be there to “have” the data yielded by the instruments (and to build the instruments in the first place). The biases that occur due to that precondition—we shall call them observation selection effects—are the subject matter of this book.
Anthropic reasoning, which seeks to detect, diagnose, and cure such biases, is a philosophical goldmine. Few fields are so rich in empirical implications, touch on so many important scientific questions, pose such intricate paradoxes, and contain such generous quantities of conceptual and methodological confusion that need to be sorted out. Working in this area is a lot of intellectual fun.
Our primary objective is to construct a theory of observation selection effects. We shall seek to develop a methodology for how to reason when we suspect that our evidence is contaminated with anthropic biases. Our secondary objective is to apply the theory to answer some interesting scientific and philosophical questions. Actually, these two objectives are largely overlapping. Only by interpolating between theoretical desiderata and the full range of philosophical and scientific applications can we arrive at a satisfactory account of observation selection effects. At least, that is the approach taken here.
We’ll use a Bayesian framework, but a reader who doesn’t like formalism should not be deterred. There isn’t an excessive amount of mathematics; most of what there is, is elementary arithmetic and probability theory, and the results are conveyed verbally also. The topic of observation selection effects is extremely difficult. Yet the difficulty is not in the math, but in grasping and analyzing the underlying principles and in selecting appropriate models.
The term “anthropic” is a misnomer. Reasoning about observation selection effects has nothing in particular to do with homo sapiens, but rather with observers in general. Carter regrets not having chosen a better name, which would no doubt have prevented much of the confusion that has plagued the field. When John Barrow and Frank Tipler introduced anthropic reasoning to a wider audience in 1986 with the publication of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, they compounded the terminological disorder by minting several new “anthropic principles”, some of which have little if any connection to observation selection effects.
SYNOPSIS OF THIS BOOK
Our journey begins in chapter 2 with a study of the significance of cosmic “fine-tuning”, referring to the apparent fact that if any of various physical parameters had been very slightly different then no observers would have existed in the universe. There is a sizable literature on what to make of such “coincidences”. Some have argued that they provide some evidence for the existence of an ensemble of physically real universes (a “multiverse”). Others, of a more religious bent, have used arguments from fine-tuning to attempt to make a case for some version of the design hypothesis. Still others claim that comic fine-tuning can have no special significance at all. The latter view is incorrect. The finding that we live in a fine-tuned universe (if that is indeed so) would, as we shall see, provide support for explanations that essentially involve observation selection effects. Such explanations raise interesting methodological issues which we will be exploring in chapter 2. I argue that only by working out a theory of observation selection effects can we get to the bottom of the fine-tuning controversies. Using analogies, we begin to sketch out a preliminary account of how observation selection effects operate in the cosmological context, which allows us to get a clearer understanding of the evidential import of fine-tuning. Later, in chapter 11, we will return to the fine-tuning arguments and use the theory that we’ll have developed in the intervening chapters to more rigorously verify the informal conclusions of chapter 2.
Given that observation selection effects are important, we next want to know more precisely what kind of beast they are and how they affect methodology. Is it possible to sum up the essence of observation selection effects in a simple statement? A multitude of so-called “anthropic principles” attempt to do just that. Chapter 3 takes a critical look at the main contenders, and finds that they fall short. Many “anthropic principles” are simply confused. Some, especially those drawing inspiration from Brandon Carter’s seminal papers, are sound, but we show that although they point in the right direction they are too weak to do any real scientific work. In particular, I argue that existing methodology does not permit any observational consequences to be derived from contemporary cosmological theories, in spite of the fact that these theories quite plainly can be and are being tested empirically by astronomers. What is needed to bridge this methodological gap is a more adequate formulation of how observation selection effects are to betaken into account. A preliminary formulation of such a principle, which we call the Self-Sampling Assumption, is proposed towards the end of chapter 3. The basic idea of the Self-Sampling Assumption is, very roughly put, that you should think of yourself as if you were a random observer from a suitable reference class.
Chapter 4 begins to build a “philosophical” case for our theory by conducting a series of thought experiments that show that something like the Self-Sampling Assumption describes a plausible way of reasoning about a wide range of cases.
Chapter 5 shows how the Self-Sampling Assumption enables us to link up cosmological theory with observation in a way that is both intuitively plausible and congruent with scientific practice. This chapter also applies the new methodology to illuminate problems in several areas, to wit: thermodynamics and the problem of time’s arrow; evolutionary biology (especially questions related to how improbable was the evolution of intelligent life on Earth and how many “critical” steps there were in our evolutionary past); and an issue in traffic analysis. An important criterion for a theory of observation selection effects is that it should enable us to make sense of contemporary scientific reasoning and that it can do interesting work in helping to solve real empirical problems. Chapter 5 demonstrates that our theory satisfies this criterion.
The notorious Doomsday argument, which seeks to show that we have systematically underestimated the probability that humankind will go extinct relatively soon, forms the subject matter for chapter 6. We review and criticize the literature on this controversial piece of reasoning, both papers that support it and ones that claim to have refuted it. I think that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive. But the reason is complicated and must await explanation until we have developed our theory further, in chapter 10.
The Doomsday argument deserves the attention it has attracted, however. Getting to the bottom of what is wrong or inconclusive about it can give us invaluable clues about how to build a sound methodology of observation selection effects. It is therefore paramount that the Doomsday argument not be dismissed for the wrong reasons. Lots of people think that they have refuted the Doomsday argument, but not all these objections can be right—many of the “refutations” are inconsistent with one another, and many pre-suppose ideas that can be shown unacceptable when tried against other criteria that a theory of anthropic reasoning must satisfy. Chapter 7 examines several recent criticisms of the Doomsday argument and explains why they fail.
In chapter 8, we refute an argument purporting to show that anthropic reasoning gives rise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. We then give an independent argument showing that there are cases where anthropic reasoning does generate probabilities that are “observer-relative” in an interesting but non-paradoxical sense.
Paradoxes lie in ambush in chapter 9. We explore the thought experiments Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe. These reveal some counterintuitive aspects of the most straightforward version of the Self-Sampling Assumption.
Is there a way out? At the end of chapter 9 we find ourselves in an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, something like the Self-Sampling Assumption seems philosophically justified and scientifically indispensable on the grounds explained in chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, we seem then to be driven towards a counterintuitive (albeit coherent) position vis-à-vis the gedanken experiments of chapter 9. What to do?Chapter 10 goes back and reexamines the reasoning that led to the formulation of the original version of the Self-Sampling Assumption. But now we have the benefit of lessons gleaned from the preceding chapters. We understand better the various constraints that our theory has to satisfy. And we have a feel for what is the source of the problems. Combining these clues, we propose a solution that enables us to escape the paradoxes while still catering to legitimate methodological needs. The first step of the solution is to strengthen the Self-Sampling Assumption so that it applies to “observer-moments” rather than just observers. This increases our analytical firepower. A second step is to relativize the reference class. The result is a general framework for modeling anthropic reasoning, which is given a formal expression in an equation, the Observation Equation, that specifies how to take into account evidence that has an indexical component or that has been subjected to an observation selection effect.
In chapter 11, we illustrate how this theory of observation selection effects works by applying it to a wide range of philosophical and scientific problems. We show how it confirms (and makes more precise) the preliminary conclusions that were arrived at by less rigorous analogy-based arguments in earlier chapters. Chapter 11 also provides an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty problem (and a fortiori its closely related game-theoretic analogues, the Absent-Minded Driver problem and the Absent-Minded Passenger problem). It is argued that the solution is more complex than previously recognized and that this makes it possible to reconcile the two opposing views that dominate the literature. We close with a discussion of the element of subjectivity that may reside in the choice of a prior credence function for indexical propositions. We compare it with the more widely recognized aspect of subjectivity infesting the non-indexical component of one’s credence function, and we suggest that the issue throws light on how to rank various applications of anthropic reasoning according to how scientifically rigorous they are. At the very end, there are some pointers to avenues for further research.
Given that observation selection effects are important, we next want to know more precisely what kind of beast they are and how they affect methodology. Is it possible to sum up the essence of observation selection effects in a simple statement? A multitude of so-called “anthropic principles” attempt to do just that. Chapter 3 takes a critical look at the main contenders, and finds that they fall short. Many “anthropic principles” are simply confused. Some, especially those drawing inspiration from Brandon Carter’s seminal papers, are sound, but we show that although they point in the right direction they are too weak to do any real scientific work. In particular, I argue that existing methodology does not permit any observational consequences to be derived from contemporary cosmological theories, in spite of the fact that these theories quite plainly can be and are being tested empirically by astronomers. What is needed to bridge this methodological gap is a more adequate formulation of how observation selection effects are to betaken into account. A preliminary formulation of such a principle, which we call the Self-Sampling Assumption, is proposed towards the end of chapter 3. The basic idea of the Self-Sampling Assumption is, very roughly put, that you should think of yourself as if you were a random observer from a suitable reference class.
Chapter 4 begins to build a “philosophical” case for our theory by conducting a series of thought experiments that show that something like the Self-Sampling Assumption describes a plausible way of reasoning about a wide range of cases.
Chapter 5 shows how the Self-Sampling Assumption enables us to link up cosmological theory with observation in a way that is both intuitively plausible and congruent with scientific practice. This chapter also applies the new methodology to illuminate problems in several areas, to wit: thermodynamics and the problem of time’s arrow; evolutionary biology (especially questions related to how improbable was the evolution of intelligent life on Earth and how many “critical” steps there were in our evolutionary past); and an issue in traffic analysis. An important criterion for a theory of observation selection effects is that it should enable us to make sense of contemporary scientific reasoning and that it can do interesting work in helping to solve real empirical problems. Chapter 5 demonstrates that our theory satisfies this criterion.
The notorious Doomsday argument, which seeks to show that we have systematically underestimated the probability that humankind will go extinct relatively soon, forms the subject matter for chapter 6. We review and criticize the literature on this controversial piece of reasoning, both papers that support it and ones that claim to have refuted it. I think that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive. But the reason is complicated and must await explanation until we have developed our theory further, in chapter 10.
The Doomsday argument deserves the attention it has attracted, however. Getting to the bottom of what is wrong or inconclusive about it can give us invaluable clues about how to build a sound methodology of observation selection effects. It is therefore paramount that the Doomsday argument not be dismissed for the wrong reasons. Lots of people think that they have refuted the Doomsday argument, but not all these objections can be right—many of the “refutations” are inconsistent with one another, and many pre-suppose ideas that can be shown unacceptable when tried against other criteria that a theory of anthropic reasoning must satisfy. Chapter 7 examines several recent criticisms of the Doomsday argument and explains why they fail.
In chapter 8, we refute an argument purporting to show that anthropic reasoning gives rise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. We then give an independent argument showing that there are cases where anthropic reasoning does generate probabilities that are “observer-relative” in an interesting but non-paradoxical sense.
Paradoxes lie in ambush in chapter 9. We explore the thought experiments Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe. These reveal some counterintuitive aspects of the most straightforward version of the Self-Sampling Assumption.
Is there a way out? At the end of chapter 9 we find ourselves in an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, something like the Self-Sampling Assumption seems philosophically justified and scientifically indispensable on the grounds explained in chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, we seem then to be driven towards a counterintuitive (albeit coherent) position vis-à-vis the gedanken experiments of chapter 9. What to do?Chapter 10 goes back and reexamines the reasoning that led to the formulation of the original version of the Self-Sampling Assumption. But now we have the benefit of lessons gleaned from the preceding chapters. We understand better the various constraints that our theory has to satisfy. And we have a feel for what is the source of the problems. Combining these clues, we propose a solution that enables us to escape the paradoxes while still catering to legitimate methodological needs. The first step of the solution is to strengthen the Self-Sampling Assumption so that it applies to “observer-moments” rather than just observers. This increases our analytical firepower. A second step is to relativize the reference class. The result is a general framework for modeling anthropic reasoning, which is given a formal expression in an equation, the Observation Equation, that specifies how to take into account evidence that has an indexical component or that has been subjected to an observation selection effect.
In chapter 11, we illustrate how this theory of observation selection effects works by applying it to a wide range of philosophical and scientific problems. We show how it confirms (and makes more precise) the preliminary conclusions that were arrived at by less rigorous analogy-based arguments in earlier chapters. Chapter 11 also provides an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty problem (and a fortiori its closely related game-theoretic analogues, the Absent-Minded Driver problem and the Absent-Minded Passenger problem). It is argued that the solution is more complex than previously recognized and that this makes it possible to reconcile the two opposing views that dominate the literature. We close with a discussion of the element of subjectivity that may reside in the choice of a prior credence function for indexical propositions. We compare it with the more widely recognized aspect of subjectivity infesting the non-indexical component of one’s credence function, and we suggest that the issue throws light on how to rank various applications of anthropic reasoning according to how scientifically rigorous they are. At the very end, there are some pointers to avenues for further research.
Bibliography:-
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122. Mackay, A.L., Future prospects discussed. Nature, 1994. 368(10 March): p. 108.
123. Martel, H., P.R. Shapiro, and S. Weinberg, Astrophysical Journal, 1998. 492(29).
124. Martin, J.L., General Relativity. 3rd ed. 1995, London: Prentice Hall.
125. McGrath, P.J., The inverse gambler's fallacy. Mind, 1988. xcvii(386): p. 265-268.
126. McMullin, E., Is philosophy relevant to cosmology? American Philosophical Quarterly, 1981. 18(3): p. 177-189.
127. McMullin, E., Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 1993. 24(3): p. 359-389.
128. Mellor, H., The matter of chance. 1971, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
129. Mellor, H., The Facts of Causation. 1994%%.
130. Minsky, M., Will Robots Inherit the Earth?, in Scientific American. 1994.
131. Misner, C. and et al., Gravitation. 1973, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.
132. Moore, G.E., Electronics, 1965. 38(8): p. 114-117.
133. Moravec, H., Mind Children. 1989, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
134. Moravec, H., When will computer hardware match the human brain? Journal of Transhumanism, 1998. 1.
135. Moravec, H., Robot: mere machine to transcendent mind. 1999, NewYork: Oxford University Press.
136. Nielsen, H.B., Did God have to fine tune the laws of nature to create light?, in Particle Physics, L. Amdric, L. Dadic, and N. Zovoko, Editors. 1981, North-Holland Publishing Company. p. 125-142.
137. Nielsen, H.B., Random dynamics and relations between the number of fermion generations and the fine structure constants. Acta Physica Polonica B, 1989. May: p. 427-68.
138. Oliver, J. and K. Korb, A Bayesian analysis of the Doomsday Argument, . 1997, Department of Computer Science, Monash University.
139. Pagels, H.R., A cosy cosmology, in Physical cosmology and philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan ;
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140. Papineau, D., Probabilities and the many minds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Analysis, 1995. 55(4): p. 239-246.
141. Papineau, D., Uncertain decisions and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Monist, 1997. 80(1): p. 97-117.
142. Parfit, D. . in The Sharman Memorial Lectures. 1997. UCL, London.
143. Parfit, D., Why anything? Why this? London Review of Books, 1998. Jan 22, 1998: p. 24-27.
144. Perlmutter, S., et al., Nature, 1998. 391(51).
145. Perry, R.M., An Alternative to Deism based on the Anthropic Principle, in Venturist monthly News. 1995.
146. Polkinghorne, J.C., One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology. 1986, London.
147. Popper, K.R., The propensity interpretation of probability. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 1959. 46: p. 545-61.
148. Regis, E.J., Extraterrestrials: Science and Alien Intelligence. 1985: Cambridge University Press.
149. Reiss, A.G., et al., AJ, 1998. 116(1009).
150. Ross, H., Astronomical evidence for the God of the Bible, . 1992.
151. Roush, S., Doomsday, Pangloss and Doctor Who. Unpublished manuscript, 1998.
152. Rozenthal, I.L., Sov. Phys. Usp., 1980. 26(6): p. 296f.
153. Sagan, C., The dragons of Eden. 1977, New York: Ballantine.
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156. Sklar, L., Ultimate explanations: comments on Tipler, in Proceedings of the 1988 biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association, A. Fine and J. Lepli, Editors. 1989, East Lansing: Michigan. p. 49-55.
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1993, Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press.
158. Skyrms, B., Causal necessity. 1980, London: Yale University Press.
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171. Tipler, F.J., Anthropic-principle arguments against steady-state cosmological theories. Observatory, 1982. 102: p. 36-39.
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This bibliography contains 192 titles, some of which are available online, covering anthropic reasoning, the Doomsday argument, and related issues in cosmology, foundations of probability theory and objective chance. It only covers items published up until the year 2000.
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3. Barrow, J.D., Anthropic definitions. Q. Jl. astr. Soc., 1983. 24: p. 146-153.
4. Barrow, J.D. and F.J. Tipler, The anthropic cosmological principle. 1986, Oxford [Oxfordshire] ; New York: Oxford University Press. xx, 706.
5. Barrow, J.D., The world within the world. 1988, Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press. xiv, 398.
6. Barrow, J.D., Theories of everything : the quest for ultimate explanation. 1991, Oxford [England] New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. xi, 223.
7. Barrow, J.D., Pi in the sky : counting, thinking, and being. 1992, Oxford New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. ix, 317.
8. Barrow, J.G., Patterns of Explanation in Cosmology, in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy, F. Bertola and U. Curi, Editors. 1993, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
9. Barrow, J.D. and J. Silk, The left hand of creation : the origin and evolution of the expanding universe. 1994, New York: Oxford University Press. . cm.
10. Barrow, J.D., The origin of the universe. Science masters series. 1994, New York: BasicBooks. xv, 150.
11. Barrow, J.D., The artful universe. 1995, Oxford Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press. x, 274.
12. Barrow, J.D., Impossibility : the limits of science and the science of limits. 1998, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. xiii, 279.
13. Barrow, J.D., Cosmology and the Origin of Life. Physics preprint archive, 1998. astro-ph/9811461(30 Nov 1998).
14. Barrow, J.D., Between inner space and outer space : essays on science, art, and philosophy. 1999, Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press. xii, 274.
15. Bartha, P. and C. Hitchcock, No One Knows the Date of the Hour: An Unorthodox Application of Rev. Bayes's Theorem. Philosophy of Science, 1999. 66 (Proceedings): p. S229-S353.
16. Bartha, P. and C. Hitchcock, The shooting-room paradox and conditionalizing on measurably challenged sets. Synthese, 2000%%: p. 403-437.
17. Barvinsky, A.O., Open inflation without anthropic principle. Physics preprint archive, 1998. hepth/9806093(v2 14 June).
18. Bigelow, J., J. Lollins, and R. Pargetter, The big bad bug: what are the Humean's chances? Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 1993. 44: p. 443-63.
19. Bitbol, M., From the Anthropic Principle to the Subject Principle, in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy, F. Bertola and U. Curi,
Editors. 1993, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
20. Black, R., Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 1998. 49: p. 371-85.
21. Boltzman, L., Zu Hrn. Zermelo's Abhandlung "Ueber die mecahnische Erklärung irreversibler Vorgänge". ???
22. Bostrom, N., Investigations into the Doomsday argument. Preprint, 1997. http://www.anthropic-principles.com/preprints/inv/investigations.html.
23. Bostrom, N., How Long Before Superintelligence? International Journal of Futures Studies, 1998. 2.
24. Bostrom, N., A review of anthropic reasoning, . 1998.
25. Bostrom, N., Singularity and Predictability, in Extropy. 1998.
26. Bostrom, N., The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking. Mind, 1999. 108(431): p. 539-50.
27. Bostrom, N. and et al., The Transhumanist FAQ, . 1999.
28. Bostrom, N., Paradoxes of the Self-sampling assumption. In preparation, 1999.
29. Bostrom, N. A Subjectivist Theory of Objective Chance. in British Society for the Philosophy of Science Conference, July 8-9. 1999. Nottingham, U.K.
30. Bostrom, N., Is the end nigh?, in The philosopher's magazine. 2000. p. 19-20.
31. Bostrom, N., Observer-relative chances in anthropic reasoning? Erkenntnis, 2000. In print.
32. Bostrom, N., Cosmological Constant and the Final Anthropic Hypothesis. Astrophysics and Space Science, 2000. Forthcoming.
33. Bostrom, N., A theory of Anthropic Reasoning and Objective Chance: PhD Dissertation, in Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific method. 2000, The London School of Economics: London.
34. Brin, G.D., The `Great Silence': The Controversy Concerning Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life. Q. Jl. R. astr. Soc., 1983. 24: p. 283-309.
35. Buch, P., Future prospects discussed. Nature, 1994. 368(10 March): p. 108.
36. Carlson, E. and E.J. Olsson, Is our existence in need of further explanation? Inquiry, 1998. 41: p. 255-75.
37. Carnap, R., On the Applications of Inductive Logic. Philosophical and phenomenological research, 1947. 8: p. 133-48.
38. Carr, B.J. and M.J. Rees, The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical world. Nature, 1979. 278(12 April): p. 605-612.
39. Carter, B., Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology, in Confrontation of cosmological theories with data, M.S. Longair, Editor. 1974, Reidel: Dordrecht. p. 291-8.
40. Carter, B., The anthropic principle and its implications for biological evolution. Phil. Trans. R. Soc., 1983. A 310(347-363).
41. Carter, B., The anthropic selection principle and the ultra-Darwinian synthesis, in The anthropic principle, F. Bertola and U. Curi, Editors. 1989, Cambridge university press: Cambridge. p. 33-63.
42. Carter, B., Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology, in Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan Publishing Company.
43. Caves, C.M., Predicting future duration from present age: A critical assessment. Physics preprint archive, 2000. astro-ph/0001414(24 Jan 2000).
44. Chislenko, A., Networking in the Mind Age, . 1996.
45. Cirkovic, M. and N. Bostrom, Cosmological Constant and the Final Anthropic Hypothesis. Physics preprint archive, 1999. gr-qc/9906042(v1, 13 Jun).
46. Collins, C.B., Why is the universe isotropic? The Astrophysical Journal, 1973. 180(March 1): p. 317-334.
47. Craig, W.L., Barrow and Tipler on the anthropic principle vs. Divine design. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1988. 38: p. 389-395.
48. Craig, W.L., Hartle-Hawking cosmology and atheism. Analysis, 1997. 57(4): p. 291-295.
49. Davis, P., What caused Big Bang, in Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan Publishing Company.
50. Delahaye, J.-P., Reserche de modeles pourl'argument de l'Apocalypse de Carter-Leslie, . 1996.
51. Dieks, D., Doomsday - Or: the Dangers of Statistics. Philosophical Quarterly, 1992. 42(166): p. 78-84.
52. Dieks, D., The Doomsday Argument, . 1999.
53. Dowe, P., Multiple universes, fine tuning and the inverse gambler's fallacy, . 1998.
54. Drexler, E., Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology. 1985, London: Forth Estate.
55. Drexler, E., Nanosystems. 1992, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
56. Dyson, F., Time without end: physics and biology in an open universe. Reviews of Modern Physics, 1979. 51(3).
57. Earman, J., The big bang and the horizon problem, in Bangs, crunches, whimpers, and shrieks.
58. Earman, J., The SAP also rises: a critical examination of the anthropic principle. Philosophical Quarterly, 1987. 24(4): p. 307-17.
59. Eckhardt, W., A Shooting-Room view of Doomsday. Journal of Philosophy, 1992. XCIV(5): p. 244-259.
60. Eckhardt, W., Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument. Mind, 1993. 102(407): p. 483-88.
61. Efstathiou, G., MNRAS, 1995. 161(1).
62. Ellis, G.F.R., Cosmology and Verifiability, in Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan Publishing Company.
63. Feoli, A. and S. Rampone, Is the Strong Anthropic Principle to Weak? Physics Preprint Archive, 1998. gr-qc/9812093(30 Dec 1998).
64. Franceschi, P., Une Solution pour l'Argument de l'Apocalypse. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1998. 28(2): p. 227-246.
65. Gale, G., The Anthropic Principle. Scientific American, 1981. 245 (June): p. 154-171.
66. Gale, G., Anthropic-principle cosmology: physics or metaphysics?, in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs, R. Hassing, Editor. 1996, Catholic University Press: Washington, D. C.
67. Gardner, M., WAP, SAP, FAP &PAP. New York Review of Books, 1986. 33(8 (May 8)): p. 22-25.
68. Garriga, J., The density parameter and the Anthropic Principle. Physics preprint archive, 1998. astro-ph/9803268(23 March).
69. Gillies, D.A., An objective theory of probability. 1973: Methuen.
70. Goodman, S., N., Future prospects discussed. Nature, 1994. 368(10 March): p. 108.
71. Gott, R.J., Implications of the Copernican principle for our future prospects. Nature, 1993. 363(27 May): p. 315-319.
72. Gott, R.J., Future prospects discussed. Nature, 1994. 368(10 March): p. 108ff.
73. Gott, R.J., A Grim Reckoning, in New Scientist. 1997. p. 36-39.
74. Gould, S.J., The Flamingo's Smile, Reflections in Natural History. 1985, London: Penguin Books.
75. Gratton, L., The anthropic principle: a critical view, in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy, F. Bertola and U. Curi, Editors. 1993, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
76. Greenberg, M., Apocalypse Not Just Now. London Review of Books, 1999. 1 July 1999: p. 19-22.
77. Grover, S., Cosmological fecundity. Inquiry, 1998. 41: p. 277-99.
78. Hacking, I., The inverse gambler's fallacy: the argument from design. The anthropic principle applied to wheeler universes. Mind, 1987: p. 331-40.
79. Hacking, I., Astronomical improbability, in Logic, methdology and philosophy of science, Fenstad and et al., Editors. 1989, Elsevier Science publishers B. V. p. 413-426.
80. Hall, N., Correcting the guide to objective chance. Mind, 1994. 103(412): p. 505-17.
81. Hanson, R., Must early life be easy? The rhythm of major evolutionary transitions, . 1998.
82. Hart, M.H., Atmospheric Evolution, the Drake Equation, and DNA: Sparse life in an Infinite
Universe, in Extraterrestrials: Where are they?, M.H. Hart and B. Zuckerman, Editors. 1982, Pergamon Press: New York.
83. Hawking, S. and N. Turok, Open Inflation Without False Vacua. Physics preprint archive, 1998. hep- th/ 9802030(5 Feb).
84. Hayek, A., 1997??
85. Heidman, J., The Anthropic Principle and the SETI perspective, in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy, F. Bertola and U. Curi, Editors. 1993, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
86. Hoefer, C., On Lewis' objective chance: 'Humean supervenience debugged'. Mind, 1997. 106(422): p. 321-34.
87. Hoefer, C., A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance, . 1999.
88. Hogan, C.J., Why is the universe just so. Physics preprint archive, 1999. astro-ph/9909295(16 Sep).
89. Jeffrey, R., The logic of decision. 1965: McGraw-Hill.
90. Kanitscheider, B., Anthropic arguments - are they really explanations?, in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy, F. Bertola and U. Curi, Editors. 1993, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
91. Katz, J., Why there is something: The Anthropic Principle and improbable events. Dialogue, 1988. XXVII: p. 111-120.
92. Kelly, K., Is the weak anthropic principle compatible with Divine design: a response to Craig (1997), . 1998.
93. Klapdor, H.V. and K. Grotz, Astrophysical Journal, 1986. 301(L39).
94. Kopf, T., P. Krtous, and D.N. Page, Too soon for doom gloom. Physics preprint, 1994. gr-gc/9407002(v3, 4 Jul.).
95. Korb, K. and J. Oliver, A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument. Mind, 1999. 107: p. 403-10.
96. Leslie, J., Observership in Cosmology: the anthropic Principle. Mind, 1983. XCII: p. 573-579.
97. Leslie, J. The Scientific Weight of Anthropic and Teleological Principles. in Conference on Teleology in Natural Science. 1985. Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh.
98. Leslie, J., No inverse gambler's fallacy in cosmology. Mind, 1988. xcvii(386): p. 269-272.
99. Leslie, J., Risking the world's end. Bulletin of the Canadian Nuclear Society, 1989. May, 10-15.
100. Leslie, J., Universes. 1989, London: Routledge.
101. Leslie, J., ed. Physical cosmology and philosophy. . 1990, Collier Macmillan: New York. viii, 277.
102. Leslie, J., Is the end of the world nigh? Philosophical Quarterly, 1990. 40(158): p. 65-72.
103. Leslie, J., in Physical cosmology and philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan ; Collier Macmillan: New York London. p. viii, 277.
104. Leslie, J., Doomsday Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly, 1992. 42(166): p. 85-87.
105. Leslie, J., Design and the Anthropic Principle. Biology and Philosophy, 1992. 7: p. 349-359.
106. Leslie, J., Doom and Probabilities. Mind, 1993. 102(407): p. 489-91.
107. Leslie, J., Fine tuning can be important. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1994. 72(3): p. 383.
108. Leslie, J., The End of the World: the science and ethics of human extinction. 1996, London: Routledge.
109. Leslie, J., A difficulty for Everett's many-worlds theory. Int. Stud. Phil. Sci., 1996. 10(3): p. 239-246.
110. Leslie, J., The Anthropic Principle Today, in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs, R. Hassing, Editor. 1996, Catholic University Press: Washington, D. C.
111. Leslie, J., Observer-relative Chances and the Doomsday argument. Inquiry, 1997. 40: p. 427-36.
112. Leslie, J., Modern cosmology & philosophy. 1998, Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. ix, 363.
113. Leslie, J., Our place in cosmos, . 1998.
114. Lewis, D., On the Plurality of Worlds. 1986, Oxford: Oxford university press.
115. Lewis, D., Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. 1986, New York: Oxford University Press.
116. Lewis, D., Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind, 1994. 103(412): p. 473-90.
117. Linde, A., in The Very Early Universe, G.W. Gibbons and et al. , Editors. 1983, Cambridge University Press.: Cambridge.
118. Linde, A., The Universe: Inflation Out Of Chaos, in New Scientist. 1985. p. 14-18.
119. Linde, A., Inflation and Quantum Cosmology. 1990, San Diego: Academic Press.
120. Linde, A. and A. Mezhlumian, On regulatization scheme dependence of predictions in inflationary cosmology. Physics preprint archive, 1999. gr-qc/9511058.
121. Mach, R., Big Numbers and the induction case for extraterrestrial intelligence. Philosophy of Science, 1993. 60: p. 204-222.
122. Mackay, A.L., Future prospects discussed. Nature, 1994. 368(10 March): p. 108.
123. Martel, H., P.R. Shapiro, and S. Weinberg, Astrophysical Journal, 1998. 492(29).
124. Martin, J.L., General Relativity. 3rd ed. 1995, London: Prentice Hall.
125. McGrath, P.J., The inverse gambler's fallacy. Mind, 1988. xcvii(386): p. 265-268.
126. McMullin, E., Is philosophy relevant to cosmology? American Philosophical Quarterly, 1981. 18(3): p. 177-189.
127. McMullin, E., Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 1993. 24(3): p. 359-389.
128. Mellor, H., The matter of chance. 1971, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
129. Mellor, H., The Facts of Causation. 1994%%.
130. Minsky, M., Will Robots Inherit the Earth?, in Scientific American. 1994.
131. Misner, C. and et al., Gravitation. 1973, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.
132. Moore, G.E., Electronics, 1965. 38(8): p. 114-117.
133. Moravec, H., Mind Children. 1989, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
134. Moravec, H., When will computer hardware match the human brain? Journal of Transhumanism, 1998. 1.
135. Moravec, H., Robot: mere machine to transcendent mind. 1999, NewYork: Oxford University Press.
136. Nielsen, H.B., Did God have to fine tune the laws of nature to create light?, in Particle Physics, L. Amdric, L. Dadic, and N. Zovoko, Editors. 1981, North-Holland Publishing Company. p. 125-142.
137. Nielsen, H.B., Random dynamics and relations between the number of fermion generations and the fine structure constants. Acta Physica Polonica B, 1989. May: p. 427-68.
138. Oliver, J. and K. Korb, A Bayesian analysis of the Doomsday Argument, . 1997, Department of Computer Science, Monash University.
139. Pagels, H.R., A cosy cosmology, in Physical cosmology and philosophy, J. Leslie, Editor. 1990, Macmillan ;
Collier Macmillan: New York
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140. Papineau, D., Probabilities and the many minds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Analysis, 1995. 55(4): p. 239-246.
141. Papineau, D., Uncertain decisions and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Monist, 1997. 80(1): p. 97-117.
142. Parfit, D. . in The Sharman Memorial Lectures. 1997. UCL, London.
143. Parfit, D., Why anything? Why this? London Review of Books, 1998. Jan 22, 1998: p. 24-27.
144. Perlmutter, S., et al., Nature, 1998. 391(51).
145. Perry, R.M., An Alternative to Deism based on the Anthropic Principle, in Venturist monthly News. 1995.
146. Polkinghorne, J.C., One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology. 1986, London.
147. Popper, K.R., The propensity interpretation of probability. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 1959. 46: p. 545-61.
148. Regis, E.J., Extraterrestrials: Science and Alien Intelligence. 1985: Cambridge University Press.
149. Reiss, A.G., et al., AJ, 1998. 116(1009).
150. Ross, H., Astronomical evidence for the God of the Bible, . 1992.
151. Roush, S., Doomsday, Pangloss and Doctor Who. Unpublished manuscript, 1998.
152. Rozenthal, I.L., Sov. Phys. Usp., 1980. 26(6): p. 296f.
153. Sagan, C., The dragons of Eden. 1977, New York: Ballantine.
154. Silk, J.W., The Big Bang. 1980, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.
155. Singh, A., Physical Review, 1995. D, 52: p. 6700ff.
156. Sklar, L., Ultimate explanations: comments on Tipler, in Proceedings of the 1988 biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association, A. Fine and J. Lepli, Editors. 1989, East Lansing: Michigan. p. 49-55.
157. Sklar, L., Phyics and Chance: Philosophical issues in the foundations of statistical mechanics.
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