Science In Crisis: A Very Strong Anthropic Principle

Science In Crisis: A Very Strong Anthropic Principle

Time is an imaginery concept

Time is an imaginery concept all along.And imaginary time is real, then? then i,x,y,z the four dimensions also become imaginery. So divine visions of people living in the past becomes possible because they were imaginery and real at the same time. Therefore Gods as we normally believe to be true.. exist as we humans do and their periphery becomes large and small accordingly. So good deeds done will help you exist in imagination as someone who was understood to have a permanent effect on mankind and deserves to hold out as immortal.

Science In Crisis :- www.evolutionarydesign.blogspot.com

The anthropic principle is continually thrust to the surface of the relevant fields of physics and evolutionary science, yet scientists dogmatically ignore the relevant implication for "biocentric preference"... in spite of the fact that it is highly probable that a true strong anthropic constraint on the forces of the universe will *necessarily* include the human evolutionary process, which indicates that there exists a mechanism that enables the universe with certain volume to "leap", to higher orders of the same basic structure.

Anthropic Principle

"A life-giving factor lies at the centre of the whole machinery and design of the world." John Wheeler

"everything about the universe tends toward humans, toward making life possible and sustaining it" Hugh Ross

"... the Anthropic Principle says that the seemingly arbitrary and unrelated constants in physics have one strange thing in common--these are precisely the values you need if you want to have a universe capable of producing life." Patrick Glynn

The Anthropic Principle was first suggested in a 1973 paper, by the astrophysicist and cosmologist Brandon Carter from Cambridge University, at a conference held in Poland to celebrate the 500th birthday of the father of modern astronomy, Nicolaus Copernicus. The Anthropic Principle is an attempt to explain the observed fact that the fundamental constants of physics and chemistry are just right or fine-tuned to allow the universe and life at we know it to exist. (see Cosmic Matters). The Anthropic Principle says that the seemingly arbitrary and unrelated constants in physics have one strange thing in common--these are precisely the values you need if you want to have a universe capable of producing life. The universe gives the appearance that it was designed to support life on earth, another example of Paley's watch.

• Gravity is roughly 1039 times weaker than electromagnetism. If gravity had been 1033 times weaker than electromagnetism, "stars would be a billion times less massive and would burn a million times faster."
  
• The nuclear weak force is 1028 times the strength of gravity. Had the weak force been slightly weaker, all the hydrogen in the universe would have been turned to helium (making water impossible, for example).
  
• A stronger nuclear strong force (by as little as 2 percent) would have prevented the formation of protons--yielding a universe without atoms. Decreasing it by 5 percent would have given us a universe without stars.
  
• If the difference in mass between a proton and a neutron were not exactly as it is--roughly twice the mass of an electron--then all neutrons would have become protons or vice versa. Say good-bye to chemistry as we know it--and to life.
  
• The very nature of water--so vital to life--is something of a mystery (a point noticed by one of the forerunners of anthropic reasoning in the nineteenth century, Harvard biologist Lawrence Henderson). Unique amongst the molecules, water is lighter in its solid than liquid form: Ice floats. If it did not, the oceans would freeze from the bottom up and earth would now be covered with solid ice. This property in turn is traceable to the unique properties of the hydrogen atom.
  
• The synthesis of carbon--the vital core of all organic molecules--on a significant scale involves what scientists view as an astonishing coincidence in the ratio of the strong force to electromagnetism. This ratio makes it possible for carbon-12 to reach an excited state of exactly 7.65 MeV at the temperature typical of the centre of stars, which creates a resonance involving helium-4, beryllium-8, and carbon-12--allowing the necessary binding to take place during a tiny window of opportunity 10-17 seconds long. Taken from God the Evidence by Patrick Glynn
  

The fact that we are living and can observe the universe, implies that the fundamental constants must be "just right" to produce life. There is an element of circular reasoning here, because if the constants were not "just right", we would not be here to observe the universe. However, the fact is that the universe does not seem to be a random or chance event. We can postulate a many universe scenario, in which only one or some universes produce life, but we cannot validate that scientifically because we only live in one of those universes.

Here are some definitions, first from Barrow and Tipler:

Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.

Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP): The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history. Because:

1. There exists one possible Universe 'designed' with the goal of generating and sustaining 'observers'. Or...
   
2. Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being (Wheeler's Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP)). Or...
   
3. An ensemble of other different universes is necessary for the existence of our Universe (which may be related to the Many_Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics).
   

Final Anthropic Principle (FAP): Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out.

The above is taken from Anthropic Principle

Copernicus suggested the sun-centred model of the planetary system rather than an earth-centred model. 500 years later the Anthropic Principle puts mankind back to centre-stage. The Anthropic Principle refutes the Darwinist's claim that we are the product of mere chance. The universe is not so random as we thought. We have a universe with a beginning and designed for man.

Books:
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John D. Barrow, Frank J. Tipler (Contributor) - 706 p.
Rare Earth : Why Complex Life Is Uncommon in the Universe by Peter Douglas Ward, Donald Brownlee (shows what makes planet earth suitable for life - habitable zones of the universe, factors include the Moon, Jupiter, continental drift).
The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos Is Designed for Discovery by Guillermo Gonzalez, Jay Wesley Richards
The Case for a Creator: A Journalist Investigates Scientific Evidence That Points Toward God by Lee Strobel
The Origin of the Universe (Science Masters Series) by John D. Barrow
The Physics of Immortality : Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead by Frank J. Tipler
The Creator and the Cosmos : How the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of the Century Reveal God by Hugh, Ph.D. Ross. 185 p.
Beyond the Cosmos: What Recent Discoveries in Astrophysics Reveal About the Glory and Love of God by Hugh Ross
A Brief History of Time by Stephen Hawking
Stephen Hawking's Universe : The Cosmos Explained by David Filkin, Stephen Hawking
God : The Evidence : The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular World by Patrick Glynn (Ch 1 deals with the evidence from the big-bang and the anthropic principle)
Links
Design and the Anthropic Principle by Hugh Ross
The Designed 'Just So' Universe Walter L. Bradley, Ph.D.
The Completely Radical Anthropic Principle - Richard Harter's World
Does the Anthropic Principle indicate that God exists? - Krishna
Quantum Mechanics, a Modern Goliath by Hugh Ross, Ph. D.
Tipler's Physics of Immortality Rant / Review by John Walker October 26, 1994
Astronomical Evidences for the God of the Bible by Hugh Ross, Ph.D.
The Anthropic Principle: Yet Another Version?
Anthropic Principle, see also Cosmic Matters
anthropic-principle.com - good links
Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design William Lane Craig
Design In Nature: The Anthropic Principle by Donald B. DeYoung, Ph.D.*
Anthropic Principle We may occupy a preferred place or preferred time in the Universe (we may also occupy a preferred universe)
An Incredible Balancing Act, God, the Anthropic Principle and Inflation
An impertinent resumé of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle by Daniel Berger
Other related links:
The Structure and Evolution of the Universe - NASA
Albert Einstein Online
Astronomy 201/211 Winter Lectures - 33 lectures on astrophysics and cosmology - must visit

What anthropic-principle.com says in short...speaks more of anthropic bias

Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy
Nick Bostrom (New York: Routledge, 2002)
On its fourth print run. Reviews below.
Amazon.com ($90,00)

Alternatively, you could request that your library buys it if it hasn't got it

A selection effect is introduced by the fact that the instrument you use to collect data (a fishing net, a mail survey, preserved trading records) samples only from a proper subset of the target domain. Analogously, there are selection effects that arise not from the limitations of some measuring device but from the fact that all observations require the existence of an appropriately positioned observer. Our data is filtered not only by limitations in our instrumentation but also by the precondition that somebody be there to “have” the data yielded by the instruments (and to build the instruments in the first place). The biases that occur due to that precondition—we shall call them observation selection effects—are the subject matter of this book.

Anthropic reasoning, which seeks to detect, diagnose, and cure such biases, is a philosophical goldmine. Few fields are so rich in empirical implications, touch on so many important scientific questions, pose such intricate paradoxes, and contain such generous quantities of conceptual and methodological confusion that need to be sorted out. Working in this area is a lot of intellectual fun.

Our primary objective is to construct a theory of observation selection effects. We shall seek to develop a methodology for how to reason when we suspect that our evidence is contaminated with anthropic biases. Our secondary objective is to apply the theory to answer some interesting scientific and philosophical questions. Actually, these two objectives are largely overlapping. Only by interpolating between theoretical desiderata and the full range of philosophical and scientific applications can we arrive at a satisfactory account of observation selection effects. At least, that is the approach taken here.

We’ll use a Bayesian framework, but a reader who doesn’t like formalism should not be deterred. There isn’t an excessive amount of mathematics; most of what there is, is elementary arithmetic and probability theory, and the results are conveyed verbally also. The topic of observation selection effects is extremely difficult. Yet the difficulty is not in the math, but in grasping and analyzing the underlying principles and in selecting appropriate models.

The term “anthropic” is a misnomer. Reasoning about observation selection effects has nothing in particular to do with homo sapiens, but rather with observers in general. Carter regrets not having chosen a better name, which would no doubt have prevented much of the confusion that has plagued the field. When John Barrow and Frank Tipler introduced anthropic reasoning to a wider audience in 1986 with the publication of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, they compounded the terminological disorder by minting several new “anthropic principles”, some of which have little if any connection to observation selection effects.

SYNOPSIS OF THIS BOOK

Our journey begins in chapter 2 with a study of the significance of cosmic “fine-tuning”, referring to the apparent fact that if any of various physical parameters had been very slightly different then no observers would have existed in the universe. There is a sizable literature on what to make of such “coincidences”. Some have argued that they provide some evidence for the existence of an ensemble of physically real universes (a “multiverse”). Others, of a more religious bent, have used arguments from fine-tuning to attempt to make a case for some version of the design hypothesis. Still others claim that comic fine-tuning can have no special significance at all. The latter view is incorrect. The finding that we live in a fine-tuned universe (if that is indeed so) would, as we shall see, provide support for explanations that essentially involve observation selection effects. Such explanations raise interesting methodological issues which we will be exploring in chapter 2. I argue that only by working out a theory of observation selection effects can we get to the bottom of the fine-tuning controversies. Using analogies, we begin to sketch out a preliminary account of how observation selection effects operate in the cosmological context, which allows us to get a clearer understanding of the evidential import of fine-tuning. Later, in chapter 11, we will return to the fine-tuning arguments and use the theory that we’ll have developed in the intervening chapters to more rigorously verify the informal conclusions of chapter 2.
Given that observation selection effects are important, we next want to know more precisely what kind of beast they are and how they affect methodology. Is it possible to sum up the essence of observation selection effects in a simple statement? A multitude of so-called “anthropic principles” attempt to do just that. Chapter 3 takes a critical look at the main contenders, and finds that they fall short. Many “anthropic principles” are simply confused. Some, especially those drawing inspiration from Brandon Carter’s seminal papers, are sound, but we show that although they point in the right direction they are too weak to do any real scientific work. In particular, I argue that existing methodology does not permit any observational consequences to be derived from contemporary cosmological theories, in spite of the fact that these theories quite plainly can be and are being tested empirically by astronomers. What is needed to bridge this methodological gap is a more adequate formulation of how observation selection effects are to betaken into account. A preliminary formulation of such a principle, which we call the Self-Sampling Assumption, is proposed towards the end of chapter 3. The basic idea of the Self-Sampling Assumption is, very roughly put, that you should think of yourself as if you were a random observer from a suitable reference class.
Chapter 4 begins to build a “philosophical” case for our theory by conducting a series of thought experiments that show that something like the Self-Sampling Assumption describes a plausible way of reasoning about a wide range of cases.
Chapter 5 shows how the Self-Sampling Assumption enables us to link up cosmological theory with observation in a way that is both intuitively plausible and congruent with scientific practice. This chapter also applies the new methodology to illuminate problems in several areas, to wit: thermodynamics and the problem of time’s arrow; evolutionary biology (especially questions related to how improbable was the evolution of intelligent life on Earth and how many “critical” steps there were in our evolutionary past); and an issue in traffic analysis. An important criterion for a theory of observation selection effects is that it should enable us to make sense of contemporary scientific reasoning and that it can do interesting work in helping to solve real empirical problems. Chapter 5 demonstrates that our theory satisfies this criterion.
The notorious Doomsday argument, which seeks to show that we have systematically underestimated the probability that humankind will go extinct relatively soon, forms the subject matter for chapter 6. We review and criticize the literature on this controversial piece of reasoning, both papers that support it and ones that claim to have refuted it. I think that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive. But the reason is complicated and must await explanation until we have developed our theory further, in chapter 10.
The Doomsday argument deserves the attention it has attracted, however. Getting to the bottom of what is wrong or inconclusive about it can give us invaluable clues about how to build a sound methodology of observation selection effects. It is therefore paramount that the Doomsday argument not be dismissed for the wrong reasons. Lots of people think that they have refuted the Doomsday argument, but not all these objections can be right—many of the “refutations” are inconsistent with one another, and many pre-suppose ideas that can be shown unacceptable when tried against other criteria that a theory of anthropic reasoning must satisfy. Chapter 7 examines several recent criticisms of the Doomsday argument and explains why they fail.
In chapter 8, we refute an argument purporting to show that anthropic reasoning gives rise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. We then give an independent argument showing that there are cases where anthropic reasoning does generate probabilities that are “observer-relative” in an interesting but non-paradoxical sense.
Paradoxes lie in ambush in chapter 9. We explore the thought experiments Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe. These reveal some counterintuitive aspects of the most straightforward version of the Self-Sampling Assumption.
Is there a way out? At the end of chapter 9 we find ourselves in an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, something like the Self-Sampling Assumption seems philosophically justified and scientifically indispensable on the grounds explained in chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, we seem then to be driven towards a counterintuitive (albeit coherent) position vis-à-vis the gedanken experiments of chapter 9. What to do?Chapter 10 goes back and reexamines the reasoning that led to the formulation of the original version of the Self-Sampling Assumption. But now we have the benefit of lessons gleaned from the preceding chapters. We understand better the various constraints that our theory has to satisfy. And we have a feel for what is the source of the problems. Combining these clues, we propose a solution that enables us to escape the paradoxes while still catering to legitimate methodological needs. The first step of the solution is to strengthen the Self-Sampling Assumption so that it applies to “observer-moments” rather than just observers. This increases our analytical firepower. A second step is to relativize the reference class. The result is a general framework for modeling anthropic reasoning, which is given a formal expression in an equation, the Observation Equation, that specifies how to take into account evidence that has an indexical component or that has been subjected to an observation selection effect.
In chapter 11, we illustrate how this theory of observation selection effects works by applying it to a wide range of philosophical and scientific problems. We show how it confirms (and makes more precise) the preliminary conclusions that were arrived at by less rigorous analogy-based arguments in earlier chapters. Chapter 11 also provides an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty problem (and a fortiori its closely related game-theoretic analogues, the Absent-Minded Driver problem and the Absent-Minded Passenger problem). It is argued that the solution is more complex than previously recognized and that this makes it possible to reconcile the two opposing views that dominate the literature. We close with a discussion of the element of subjectivity that may reside in the choice of a prior credence function for indexical propositions. We compare it with the more widely recognized aspect of subjectivity infesting the non-indexical component of one’s credence function, and we suggest that the issue throws light on how to rank various applications of anthropic reasoning according to how scientifically rigorous they are. At the very end, there are some pointers to avenues for further research.

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Made Just For You followed by Gopal's reply to the same article.

John walks into his bedroom on his tenth birthday and "Hey Presto!" The first thing that catches his eye is a new easy chair that's just the right size for him. He looks around and sees a brand new jacket that fits him exactly. Also there are shoes and stockings that are just perfect for him. To his great surprise and pleasure, he finds several new items, which are all, so to speak, tailormade for him.
WHAT DOES HE CONCLUDE ON SEEING ALL THIS?
"That's elementary, my dear Watson. It's a birthday surprise arranged by his father." The arrangement of John's room is an example of an acausal phenomenon. That is, knowing the effect that one wants in advance, all the causes are adjusted to produce that effect. Acausal systems clearly need an intelligence, which understands the effect desired and then arranges the factors involved so that the effect is achieved. In the above example, the effect desired was the various birthday gifts for John and the intelligence that arranged for them was John's father.
THE TABLES HAVE TURNED
Acausal phenomena are unfamiliar to modern scientific thought, which mostly studies causal phenomena, wherein a cause produces an effect. The general agreement among the scientists till a few decades ago was that the design of life on earth was a result of aimless causal processes. Thus they seemed to have explained away the need of an intelligent designer for the universe. But in the last few decades the tables have turned dramatically. So much so that Robert Jastrow, Professor at Columbia University and Founder and Director of the Goddard Space Center, has made this astounding comment in his book God and the Astronomers, "For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story [of the big bang] ends like a bad dream. For the past three hundred years, scientists have scaled the mountain of ignorance and as they pull themselves over the final rock, they are greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries." In other words, scientific investigations, which were meant to disprove the existence of God, have ended up proving His existence!
THE ANTHROPIC PRINICIPLE
This counter-revolution began with the postulation of the Anthropic Principle by Brandon Carter in 1973.The Anthropic Principle, in its simplest form, states that we can observe in the universe only those things, which are conducive to our existence as observers.It means that the entire universe, the solar system, the earth, its geology, weather, flora and fauna are all designed to make our existence possible. On a freezing cold night, John runs trembling into his bedroom and shuts the door. To his amazement, he finds that his room is warm, cosy and fresh. On further observation, he realizes that his room has been sealed from all sides with a special material in order to be 100% cold-proof. He also notes that a room heater is the cause of the warmth. He also sees an oxygen cylinder, which accounts for the fresh air. Let us now see something quite similar in nature - the four remarkable properties of water, which preserve aquatic life in the water bodies throughout the long winters. Water has maximum density at 4 degrees centigrade. And ice due to its lower density remains on the surface thus preventing the entire water body from freezing. This is similar to the cold-proof covering around John's room. Water also absorbs vast quantities of oxygen at low tempratures, which is akin to the oxygen cylinder in John's room. And water also releases large quantities of heat as it freezes, which achieves an effect similar to the heater in John's room. The arrangement of John's room on that winter night was obviously an acausal event. Similarly the arrangement of the water bodies in winter is also an acausal event. The same principle holds true even for our existence. We need oxygen to survive and there is oxygen in the atmosphere. Lest all the oxygen get exhausted by our breathing, there is a natural arrangement to replenish it - photosynthesis in trees. Water is essential for our existence, but all the water lies in the ocean. There is a fantastic natural water transport system thruough the airway - the rains. The mobile water tanks in this system are so incredibly designed that an entire plane can pass right through the tank and yet there is no leakage. Guessed what we are talking about? Clouds. These are just gross and obvious examples to show how the world is perfectly designed to offer complete hospitality to us, its inhabitants. This same principle is true at every level in the universe- right from the microscopic to the macroscopic. One of the remarkable discoveries of the past 30 years has been the recognition that small changes in any of the universal constants produce surprisingly dramatic changes in the universe, rendering it unsuitable for life, not just as we know it, but for life of any conceivable type. For example If the strong force which binds together the nucleus of atoms, were just five percent weaker, only hydrogen would be stable and, needless to say, in a one-element universe, life would be an impossibility. On the other hand, if the strong force were just two percent stronger, very massive nuclei would form, which are unsuitable for the chemistry of living systems. If the relationship between the strong force and the electromagnetic force were to vary only slightly, we would have had a universe either rich in beryllium and little, if any, carbon or alternatively, a universe rich in oxygen with no carbon. Without carbon there would be no organic compounds and obviously no life. In excess of 100 examples have been documented in the technical literature and summarized in such books as the Anthropic Cosmological Principle (1986). And more are constantly being discovered. The anthropic principle and its implications can be better appreciated with an analogy. Suppose I am playing a dice game with my life at stake. If the dice gives a '6', I live, else I die. I roll the dice and it gives '6'. "Good luck saved you", you will say. If I get '6' five successive times, you will start smelling something fishy. If I get '6' 1.000 successive times, you will be practically sure that the dice has been rigged. This is exactly what we see in the universe. Everything in the universe has to have a particular value for our existence to be possible and everything has exactly that value. Everything - right from the rate at which the universe expands after the big bang, the percentage of the nuclear fusion energy on the sun which is converted into starlight, the distance of the sun from the earth, the delicate ecological balance on the earth, the anomalous behavior of water.... The list goes on and on. In marketing language, it could be confidently said that the universe is "made just for you".
AN ACAUSAL UNIVERSE
The philosophical implications of the anthropic principle shake the very foundation of mechanistic science. Sir Fred Hoyle, the famous British astronomer in the book The Intelligent Universe comments, "Such properties seem to run through the fabric of the natural world like a thread of happy coincidences. But there are so many odd coincidences essential to life that some explanation seems required to account for them." The conclusion is unmistakable. The universe we live in is an acausal system, that is, it has been designed with the express purpose of enabling our existence here. And that means it must have an intelligent designer. Surveying the available evidence, George Smoot, Professor at the University of California at Berkeley, states in unambiguous terms, "It's like looking at God."do comment on this. Do u also think so?????????? ????????? ????????? ???------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ------------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -

Wikipedia on the anthropic principle

Anthropic principle

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In physics and cosmology, the anthropic principle is an umbrella term for various dissimilar attempts to explain the structure of the universe by way of coincidentally balanced features that are necessary and relevant to the existence on Earth of biochemistry, carbon-based life, and eventually human beings to observe such a universe. The common (and "weak") form of the anthropic principle is a truism or tautology that begins with the observation that the universe appears surprisingly hospitable to the emergence of life, particularly complex multicellular life, that can make such an observation and concludes with that premise that in only such a fine-tuned universe can such living observers exist. Given the extreme simplicity of the universe at the start of the Big Bang, the friendliness of the universe to complex structures such as galaxies, planetary systems, and biology is unexpected by any normal model of turbulence driven structuring that science has been able to derive.

The idea evolved from the so-called "Dicke's coincidence", and has subsequently been reinforced by the discovery of many more anthropic coincidences since Robert Dicke first noted that the evolution of the universe is not random, but is coincidentally constrained by biological factors [1] that require that the age of the universe had to be roughly this "golden-age" [2]. Much younger, and there would not have been time for sufficient interstellar levels of carbon to build up by nucleosynthesis, but much older, and the golden age of main sequence stars and stable planetary systems would have already come to an end.

The anthropic principle also acts as a convenient category for physical and cosmological reasoning that takes into account the existence of a biosphere on Earth in an essential way. Attempts to invoke the "anthropic principle" to develop scientific explanations has led to more than a little confusion and controversy.

Much of the controversy arises from the perception that some versions of the Principle re-introduce the Argument from Design for the existence of God.

Contents[hide]
1 More anthropic coincidences
2 Origin of the anthropic cosmological principle
3 Observational evidence
4 Variants of the anthropic principle
5 The Anthropic Cosmological Principle
6 Criticisms
7 Anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning
8 Anthropic principle in cosmic inflation
9 Anthropic principle in string theory
10 "Anthropomorphic" Principle
11 See also
12 References
13 External links


[edit] More anthropic coincidences

The relevant anthropic coincidences [2] occur in complete unexpected contrast to all attempts to model the evolution of the universe, and have been "unfolding" since the moment of the big bang, ranging in magnitude from our local ecosystem, all the way up the ladder to the near-perfectly balanced, "flat" structuring of the universe, itself, so the universe appears to be surprisingly hospitable to the emergence of life at a specific time and "location" [3] in the history of the universe, particularly, complex multicellular carbon-based life.

Given the extreme simplicity of the universe at the start of the Big Bang, the friendliness of the universe to complex structures such as galaxies, planetary systems, and biology is unexpected by any normal model of turbulence driven structuring that we have been able to derive. It is therefore possible to use anthropic reasoning to make testable predictions about the features of the observed universe from the average of extreme opposing runaway tendencies that are known to be inherent to the anthropic coincidences, as well as to choose from a multiverse of different configurations, in lieu of a more viable stability mechanism.

Carbon-based life is either a likely and thus necessary outcome of the observed structure and stability of the universe, or it is a part of an engine of creation that favors such outcomes. So a proven identification of a stability mechanism may be expected to settle this question of causality, which means that the strong anthropic principle (SAP) can be further supported or falsified. If falsified, only the weak anthropic principle (WAP), essentially a tautology, remains.

Attempts to invoke the "principle" to develop scientific explanations have led to more than a little confusion, and controversy.

[edit] Origin of the anthropic cosmological principle

The first to employ the phrase "anthropic principle" appears to have been the theoretical astrophysicist Brandon Carter, in his contribution to a 1973 Kraków symposium titled Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data honouring Copernicus's 500th birthday. Carter articulated the Anthropic Principle as an ecological correction, so called, of what is now called the Cosmological Principle. This Principle extends the principle of relativity so as to require that all observers experience the same laws of physics uniformly throughout the universe. Hence at any given time, the universe will be both homogeneous and isotropic, (in 3-D space). This defines a non-applicable principle of mediocrity, one precluding the existence of a mechanism favoring any particular time and location for the appearance of carbon-based life as we know it.

The Anthropic Principle was also formulated in the 1940's, in relation to relativistic cosmology and physics constants, by Abraham Zelmanov[3], a prominent scientist in the General Theory of Relativity and cosmology.

Copernicus argued that the Earth is not the centre of the solar system, but Carter noted that pure cosmological extensions of this idea are what he called the anticentrist dogma, that led to cosmological formulations like the Perfect Cosmological Principle, which does not result from the evolutionary physics that derives the cosmic coincidences and the otherwise unexplained large scale structuring of the universe that becomes absurdly apparent with the cosmological constant problem. This vexing problem is why the Anthropic Principle has acquired a following among String Theorists trying to choose the correct vacuum solution from the landscape, since no other stability mechanism explaining why this is so has been proposed. Carter's symposium paper, "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," included the statement: "Although our situation is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent".[4]

Carter was not the first to invoke some form of the anthropic principle. For instance, Robert H. Dicke wrote in 1957 that: "The age of the Universe 'now' is not random but conditioned by biological factors ... [changes in the values of the fundamental constants of physics] would preclude the existence of man to consider the problem."[5] Alfred Russel Wallace anticipated the weak anthropic principle as long ago as 1903: "Such a vast and complex universe as that which we know exists around us, may have been absolutely required ... in order to produce a world that should be precisely adapted in every detail for the orderly development of life culminating in man."[6] The WAP is perhaps even echoed by Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism: "The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature."[7]

[edit] Observational evidence

The observed values of the dimensionless parameters (such as the fine-structure constant) that govern the four forces of nature are finely balanced. A slight increase in the strong nuclear force would bind the dineutron and the diproton and all the hydrogen in the early universe would have been converted to helium. There would be no water or long-lived stable stars that are essential for the development of life. Similar relationships are evident in each of the four force strengths. If they are modified sufficiently the universe's structure and capacity for life is greatly affected.

[edit] Variants of the anthropic principle

Proponents of the anthropic principle submit that the universe appears "fine-tuned" so as to permit life as we know it to exist, because were the universe not fine tuned in this fashion, human beings would not exist and hence could not observe the universe.
Barrow and Tipler (1986) propose three important variants of the Anthropic Principle, Weak, Strong, and Final, listed below in order of increasing strength:

• Weak anthropic principle (WAP): "The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so."[8]
  
• The Merriam-Webster Unabridged dictionary defines WAP as conditions that are observed in the universe must allow the observer to exist.
  

If any of the fundamental physical constants were sufficiently different, then life as we know it would not be possible and no one would be around to contemplate the universe we live in. Barrow and Tipler, among others, argue that the WAP explains the fundamental physical constants, such as the fine structure constant, the number of dimensions in the universe, and the cosmological constant.

From Roger Penrose:

Is there something special about our particular location in the universe, either in space or in time? These are the kinds of question that are addressed by what has become known as the anthropic principle. This principle has many forms. (See Barrow and Tipler 1986.) The most clearly acceptable of these addresses merely the spatiotemporal location of conscious (or 'intelligent') life in the universe. This is the weak anthropic principle. The argument can be used to explain why the conditions happen to be just right for the existence of (intelligent) life on the earth at the present time. For if they were not just right, then we should not have found ourselves to be here now, but somewhere else, at some other appropriate time. This principle was used very effectively by Brandon Carter and Robert Dicke to resolve an issue that had puzzled physicists for a good many years. The issue concerned various striking numerical relations that are observed to hold between the physical constants (the gravitational constant, the mass of the proton, the age of the universe, etc.). A puzzling aspect of this was that some of the relations hold only at the present epoch in the earth's history, so we appear, coincidentally, to be living at a very special time (give or take a few million years!). This was later explained, by Carter and Dicke, by the fact that this epoch coincided with the lifetime of what are called main-sequence stars, such as the sun. At any other epoch, so the argument ran, there would be no intelligent life around in order to measure the physical constants in question-so the coincidence had to hold, simply because there would be intelligent life around only at the particular time that the coincidence did hold!

—The Emperor's New Mind

• Strong anthropic principle (SAP): "The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history."[9] Barrow and Tipler then propose three elaborations of the SAP:[10]
  
• "There exists one possible Universe 'designed' with the goal of generating and sustaining 'observers.' " This can be seen as simply the classic design argument dressed in the garb of contemporary cosmology. It implies that the purpose of the universe is to give rise to intelligent life, with the laws of nature and their fundamental constants set to ensure that life as we know it will emerge and evolve. ("The Rejection of Pascal's Wager")
  
• "Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being." Barrow and Tipler believe that this can be validly inferred from quantum mechanics.
  
• "An ensemble of other different universes is necessary for the existence of our Universe." Thus Barrow and Tipler sympathize with the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
  
• Final anthropic principle (FAP): "Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out."[11]
  

In his review of Barrow and Tipler in the New York Review of Books', Martin Gardner ridiculed the FAP by quoting the last two sentences of their book:

• Completely ridiculous anthropic principle (CRAP): "At the instant the Omega Point is reached, life will have gained control of all matter and forces not only in a single universe, but in all universes whose existence is logically possible; life will have spread into all spatial regions in all universes which could logically exist, and will have stored an infinite amount of information, including all bits of knowledge which it is logically possible to know. And this is the end."[12]
  

In Carter's original definition, the WAP referred only to certain "cosmological" parameters, namely our space/time location within the universe, and not to values of the fundamental physical constants, which would fall under the SAP according to him. He also refers to "observers" rather than "carbon-based life". This ambiguity is a reason for the ongoing disagreements about the status of the various Anthropic Principles.

Proponents of intelligent design claim support from the SAP. On the other hand, the existence of the multiverse or alternate universes is hypothesized for other reasons and the WAP provides a plausible explanation for the fine tuning of our universe. Assuming there are possible universes capable of supporting intelligent life, some actual universes must do so and ours clearly is one of those. However, alternatives to intelligent design are not limited to hypothesizing the existence of alternate universes, and some advocates of evolution claim support from the Anthropic Principle. On the other hand, Ikeda and Jefferys (2006) argue that the Anthropic Principle as conventionally stated actually undermines intelligent design.[13] This is discussed in more detail in fine-tuned universe.

[edit] The Anthropic Cosmological Principle

The most thorough extant study of the anthropic principle is the controversial book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John D. Barrow, a cosmologist, and Frank J. Tipler, a mathematical physicist. This book contains an extensive review of the relevant history of ideas, because its authors believe that the anthropic principle has important antecedents in the notions of intelligent design, the philosophies of Fichte, Hegel, Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead, and the omega point cosmology of Teilhard de Chardin. Barrow and Tipler carefully distinguish teleological reasoning from eutaxiological reasoning; the former asserts that order must have a consequent purpose; the latter asserts more modestly that order must have a planned cause. They attribute this important but nearly always overlooked distinction to Hicks (1883).[14]

Barrow and Tipler set out in great detail the seemingly incredible coincidences that characterize our universe and that permit human beings to evolve in it. They then maintain that only the anthropic principle can make sense of this raft of coincidences. Everything from the energy states of the electron to the exact strength of the weak nuclear force seems tailored for us to exist. That our universe contains carbon-based life is contingent upon the values of several independent parameters, and were the value of any of those parameters to vary slightly, carbon-based life could not exist. While Barrow and Tipler (1986) is primarily a work of theoretical physics, it also discusses a variety of related topics in chemistry and earth science.

In 1983, Brandon Carter, qualifying his 1974 paper, stated that the anthropic principle, in its original form, was meant only to caution astrophysicists and cosmologists about possible errors in the interpretation of astronomical and cosmological data if they failed to take into account constraints arising from the biological nature of the observer. Carter also warned that the inverse was true for evolutionary biologists; in interpreting the evolutionary record, one must take into account cosmological and astrophysical considerations. With this in mind, Carter concluded that, given the best estimates of the age of the universe (then about 15 billion years, now 13.7 billion years), the evolutionary chain probably can allow only one or two low probability links. A. Feoli and S. Rampone[15] argue for a higher number of low probability links, given the size of our universe and the likely number of planets. The higher number of low probability links is less consistent with the claim that the emergence of life and its subsequent evolution requires intelligent design.

Recent work in observational cosmology and the theory of quantum gravity has led to renewed interest in the anthropic principle. Quantum gravity attempts to unify gravity with the other forces. While there have been a number of promising developments, all such theories suffer from the problem that the fundamental physical constants are unconstrained. The observational motivation comes from more precise estimates of quantities such as the matter density of the universe. Recent estimates of this density are about 0.3, while cosmological theory generally predicts a value indistinguishable from one.

There are alternatives to the anthropic principle, the most optimistic being that a Theory of everything will ultimately be discovered, uniting all forces in the universe and deriving from scratch all properties of all particles. Candidate "theories of everything" include M-Theory and various theories of quantum gravity, although all theories of this nature are currently deemed speculative. Another possibility is Lee Smolin's model of cosmological natural selection, also known as fecund universes, which proposes that universes have "offspring" which are more plentiful if they happen to have features common to our universe. Also see Gardner (2005) and his "selfish biocosm hypothesis."[16]

[edit] Criticisms

Some forms of the anthropic principle have been criticized as an argument by lack of imagination for assuming that the only possible chemistry of life is one based on carbon compounds and liquid water (sometimes called "carbon chauvinism", see also alternative biochemistry). The range of fundamental physical constants allowing evolution of carbon-based life may also be much less restrictive than proposed.[17] However, many of the fine-tuned details of our universe would rule out complex structures of any kind - stars, planets, galaxies etc - if violated.

The WAP is being called a tautology by its supporters and a truism by its critics, for stating something not obvious to everyone yet trivially true. The weak anthropic principle implies that our ability to ponder cosmology at all is contingent on all fundamental physical parameters having numerical values falling within quite a narrow range. Critics reply that this is simply tautological reasoning, an elaborate way of saying "if things were different, they would be different". If this is granted, the WAP becomes a truism saying nothing and explaining nothing, because in order for us to be here to ponder the universe, that universe has to be structured so that we can exist. Peter Schaefer denies that labelling the WAP a truism invalidates it, on the grounds that one cannot refute a statement merely by saying that it is true.

Critics of the SAP claim that it is neither testable nor falsifiable, and thus is not science. The FAP is discussed in more detail under final anthropic principle; Barrow and Tipler (1986) state that while the FAP is a valid physical statement, it is also "closely connected with moral values".

The anthropic principle at first glance seems to discourage research into a theory of everything, however it only suggests that progress made regarding a theory of everything must allow the observer of such progress to exist.

Hawking (2004) suggests that our universe is much less 'special' than the proponents of the anthropic principle claim it is. According to Hawking, there is a 98% chance that a Big Bang will result in a universe of the same type as ours. However, some question whether the equations Hawking employs to reach this conclusion are scientifically meaningful, and what sort of universe can be said to be of the "same type as ours".

Hawking's wave function of the universe, he and others have claimed, shows how our universe could have come into existence without any relation to anything existing prior to it, i.e., could have come out of "nothing." As of 2004, however, this work remains debatable. Moreover, as Hawking wrote in 1988, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?...Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?" (Hawking 1988). That "there is something instead of nothing" is the fundamental problem of metaphysics. Although it has been argued that it is a fallacy to even consider "nothingness" as a possible form of reality, of existence, and that, fundamentally, only something can ever, or must, exist.

Paul Davies, has discussed these issues at length, and in his recent book The Goldilocks Enigma summarises the current state of the debate in detail. He concludes by enumerating the alternative responses to the issue:

• A - yet to be developed - 'Theory of Everything' will explain why the various features of the Universe must have exactly the values that we see.
  
• Multiple Universes exist which have all possible combinations of characteristics, and we naturally find ourselves within the one that supports our existence.
  
• An intelligent Creator designed the Universe specifically to support complexity and the emergence of Intelligence.
  
• It just happens to be that way.
  
  

[edit] Anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning

In 2002, Nick Bostrom asked "Is it possible to sum up the essence of observation selection effects in a simple statement?" He concluded that it might be, but that:
Many 'anthropic principles' are simply confused. Some, especially those drawing inspiration from Brandon Carter's seminal papers, are sound, but... they are too weak to do any real scientific work. In particular, I argue that existing methodology does not permit any observational consequences to be derived from contemporary cosmological theories, though these theories quite plainly can be and are being tested empirically by astronomers. What is needed to bridge this methodological gap is a more adequate formulation of how observation selection effects are to be taken into account.

His Self-Sampling Assumption is "that you should think of yourself as if you were a random observer from a suitable reference class." This he expands into a model of anthropic bias and anthropic reasoning under the uncertainty introduced by not knowing your place in our universe - or even who "we" are. This may also be a way to overcome various cognitive bias limits inherent in the humans doing the observation and sharing models of our universe using mathematics, as suggested in the cognitive science of mathematics.

[edit] Anthropic principle in cosmic inflation

Main article: Cosmic Inflation

A critique of cosmic inflation, questioning the very premise of the theory, was offered by Don N. Page[18] who emphasized the point that initial conditions which made it possible that a thermodynamic arrow of time in a Big Bang type of theory must necessarily include a low entropy initial state of the Universe and therefore to be extremely improbable. The critique was rebutted by P. C. W. Davies[19] who used an inflationary version of the anthropic principle. While accepting the premise that the initial state of the visible Universe (originally a microscopic amount of space before the inflation) had to possess a very low entropy value -- due to random quantum fluctuations -- to account for the observed thermodynamic arrow of time, he deemed it not a problem of the theory but an advantage. The fact that the small fragment of space from which our Universe grew had to be extremely orderly to allow inflation resulting in a universe with an arrow of time makes it unnecessary to adopt any ad-hoc hypotheses about the initial entropy state which are necessary in other Big Bang theories.

[edit] Anthropic principle in string theory

Main article: String theory landscape

String theory predicts a large number of possible universes, called the backgrounds or vacua. The set of these universes or vacua is often called the "multiverse" or "anthropic landscape" or "string landscape". Leonard Susskind has argued that the existence of a large number of vacua puts the anthropic reasoning on firm ground; only universes with the remarkable properties sufficient to allow observers to exist are beheld while a possibly much larger set of universes without such properties go utterly unnoted. Steven Weinberg[20] refers to the Anthropic Principle as a "turning point" in modern science since, applied to the string landscape, it "may explain how the constants of nature that we observe can take values suitable for life without being fine-tuned by a benevolent creator." Others, most notably David Gross but also Lubos Motl, Peter Woit and Lee Smolin, argue that this is not predictive. Max Tegmark [21], Mario Livio and Martin Rees[22] respond that various ingredients of well-accepted theories will never be testable, and that the test of a physical theory is not that every aspect of it should be observable and/or testable, but rather that enough is observable and testable to give confidence in the theory's correctness.

[edit] "Anthropomorphic" Principle

The Anthropic Principle is sometimes misspelled or pronounced 'Anthropomorphic'. Anthropomorphism is the assigning of human characteristics to non-human beings, inanimate objects, or natural or supernatural phenomena. Anthropomorphic Principle is redirected to this page to aid searchers in finding the correct spelling.

[edit] See also

• Anthropic landscape
  
• Big Bounce
  
• Cosmological natural selection
  
• Doomsday argument
  
• Fine-tuned universe
  
• Inverse gambler's fallacy
  
• metaphysical naturalism
  
• Perfect Cosmological Principle
  
• Principle of mediocrity
  
• Rare Earth hypothesis
  
• Teleology
  
• Weakless Universe
  
  

[edit] References

1. ^ Genesis of Eden Diversity Encyclopedia
   
2. ^ The Goldilock's Enigma,, Paul Davies
   
3. ^ Rabounski D. Zelmanov's Anthropic Principle and Infinite Relativity Principle. Progress in Physics, 2006, v.1, 35-37. [1]
   
4. ^ IAUS 63 (1974) 291
   
5. ^ Dicke 1957, "Principle of Equivalence and Weak Interactions," Rev. Mod. Phys. 29: 355
   
6. ^ Alfred R. Wallace (1904). Man's place in the universe: a study of the results of scientific research in relation to the unity or plurality of worlds, 4th ed. London: George Bell & Sons, 256-7.
   
7. ^ The German Ideology, chpt. 1., Marx 1845
   
8. ^ John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler (1986). The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford Univ. Press, 16. ISBN 0-19-282147-4.
   
9. ^ Barrow and Tipler 1986: 21
   
10. ^ Barrow and Tipler 1986: 22
    
11. ^ Barrow and Tipler 1986: 23
    
12. ^ Barrow and Tipler 1986: 677
    
13. ^ http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/anthropic.html
    
14. ^ Hicks, L. E. (1883). A Critique of Design Arguments. New York: Scribner's.
    
15. ^ A. Feoli, and S. Rampone (1999). "Is the Strong Anthropic Principle too weak?". Nuovo Cim. B114: 281–289. arXiv:gr-qc/9812093.
    
16. ^ http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0647.html
    
17. ^ Stenger, Victor J (2000). Timeless Reality: Symmetry, Simplicity, and Multiple Universes. ISBN 1-57392-859-3.
    
18. ^ D.N. Page, 1983, "Inflation does not explain time asymmetry", Nature, 304, 39
    
19. ^ P.C.W. Davies, 1984, "Inflation to the universe and time asymmetry", Nature, 312, 524
    
20. ^ http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0511037
    
21. ^ M. Tegmark, Ann. Phys. 270, 1 (1998).
    
22. ^ M. Livio and M. J. Rees, Science 309, 1022 (12 August, 2003).
    

• Nick Bostrom, 2002. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-93858-9. 5 chapters available online.
  
• Brandon Carter, "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle" in Longair, M. S., ed., IAU Symposium 63: Confrontation of Cosmological Theory with Astronomical Data. Reidel (Dordrecht, Netherlands): 291-98.
  
• ------, 2004, "Anthropic Principle in Cosmology." Paper presented at the conference "Cosmology: Facts and Problems," hosted by the College de France.
  
• Craig, William Lane, 1987, "Critical review of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle," International Philosophical Ouarterly 27: 437- 47.
  
• Gardner, James N., 2005, "The Physical Constants as Biosignature: An anthropic retrodiction of the Selfish Biocosm Hypothesis," International Journal of Astrobiology.
  
• Martin Gardner, "WAP, SAP, PAP, and FAP," The New York Review of Books 23, No. 8 (May 8, 1986): 22-25.
  
• Hawking, Stephen W. (1988). A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam Books, p.174. ISBN 0-553-34614-8.
  
• Kane, Gordon L., Malcolm J. Perry, and Anna N. Zytkow (2002). "The Beginning of the End of the Anthropic Principle". New Astron. 7: 45–53. arXiv:astro-ph/0001197.
  
• Simon Conway Morris, 2003. Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe. Cambridge Univ. Press.
  
• Sober, Elliott, 2005, "The Design Argument" in Mann, W. E., ed., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell Publishers.
  
• Stenger, Victor J., 1999, "Anthropic design," The Skeptical Inquirer 23 (August 31 1999): 40-43
  
• Taylor, Stuart Ross, 1998. Destiny or Chance: Our Solar System and Its Place in the Cosmos. Cambridge Univ. Press.
  
• Max Tegmark, 1997, "On the dimensionality of spacetime," Classical and Quantum Gravity 14: L69-L75. A simple anthropic argument for why there are 3 spatial and 1 temporal dimensions.
  
• Max Tegmark, 1998, "Is `the theory of everything' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?" Annals of Physics 270: 1-51.
  
• Frank J. Tipler, 2003, "Intelligent Life in Cosmology," International Journal of Astrobiology 2: 141-48.
  
• Ward, P. D., and Brownlee, D., 2000. Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe. Springer Verlag.
  
• A Universe without Weak interactions - Roni Harnik, Graham Kribs, Gilad Perez - Phys. Rev.D74:035006,2006.
  
• Alex Vilenkin, 2006, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes. Hill and Wang. ISBN 978-0809095230
  
  

[edit] External links

• Nick Bostrom: web site devoted to the Anthropic Principle.
  
• Chown, Marcus, Anything Goes, New Scientist, 6 June 1998. On Max Tegmark's work.
  
• Stephen Hawking, Anthropic Reasoning Kavli-CERCA Conference Video Archive.
  
• Ikeda, Michael, and Jefferys, Bill, 2006, The Anthropic Principle Does Not Support Supernaturalism
  
• Tobin, Paul N., 2000, "Is the Universe Fine-Tuned for Life?" A critique of the Anthropic Principle from an atheist viewpoint.
  
• Steven Weinberg, 2005, Living in the multiverse
  
• "Anthropic Coincidence" — the anthropic controversy as a segue to Lee Smolin's theory of cosmological natural selection.
  
• Leonard Susskind and Lee Smolin debate the Anthropic Principle.
  debate among scientists on arxiv.org.
  
• Evolutionary Probability and Fine Tuning
  
• Critical review of "The Privileged Planet"
  
• Cosmologists apply anthropic reasoning different from Steven Weinberg's to universes different from ours and arrive at different(lower) "optimal" values for the cosmological constant
  

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